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JUL  10  lOin 


TME  FIESEKIT 
COMCEFTlOi  or 


lOWTIOHl 


A'^'A 


PROF.  BENJ.  B.  WARFIELD,    D.  D..  LL.  D, 


^  We  have  mmH  permission  from  Dr.  Warfield  to  reprint  the  fol- 
lowing pages.  Additional  copies  can  he  secured  from  us  at  10  cents  a 
copy.    Address  The  College  Printing  Office,  Empm-ia,  Kansas. 


•• 


THE  PRESENT  DAY  CONCEPTION  OF  EVOLUTION. 


There  seems  to  be  an  impression  abroad  that  the  adherents  of 
the  doctrine  of  evolution  have  hopelessly  fallen  out  among-  them- 
selves, and  threaten  to  destroy  by  internecine  conflict  the  hold 
which  this  doctrine  has  obtained  upon  scientific  thought.  This 
impression  is  an  erroneous  one.  Evolutionists  do  differ  gravely 
from  one  another  on  such  subordinate  matters  as  the  causes  of 
variation,  the  classes  of  variation  which  may  be  preserved  by  he- 
redity, and  the  selective  factors  at  work  in  the  gradual  moulding 
of  organic  forms.  In  particular  two  strongly  marked  parties  have 
emerged  among  them,  differing  radically  upon  these  subordinate 
matters.  One  of  these,  led  by  Prof.  Weismann,  holds  that  all 
hereditable  variations  are  congenital  and  purely  fortuitous;  and 
that  "natural  selection,"  acting  upon  these  fortuitous  congenital 
differences,  gradually  moulds  the  successive  organisms  into  better 
and  better  harmony  with  their  environment.  The  other  party,  to 
which  probably  the  majority  of  evolutionists  give  in  their  adhe- 
sion, holds  that  variation  is  strongly  stimulated  by  use  and  disuse 
of  organs:  that  such  acquired  qualities  are  hereditary;  and  that 
thus  "natural  selection"  has  not  merely  a  body  of  purely  fortuitous 
variations,  but  a  series  of  definitely  adaptive  changes  to  work  upon. 
The  difference  between  these  two  forms  of  the  theory  of  evolution 
is  not  a  small  one.  But  it  is  obviously  not  a  difference  fundamen- 
tal to  the  conception  of  evolution  itself,  but  one  which  has  refer- 
ence only  to  the  modes  of  its  working.  Evolutionists  appear  to  be 
entirely  and  even  increasingly  at  one  in  their  fundamental  con- 
ception of  the  doctrine. 

We  have  lately  been  led  to  observe  this,  in  anii^'esting  way, 
by  the  circumstance  of  the  appearance,  in  a  single  issue  of  a  quar- 
terly journal,  of  two  general  papers  on  evolutionary  philosophy  by 
such  representative  evolutionists  as  Prof.  Joseph  Le  Conte,  of  the 
University  of  California,  and  Prof.  E.  D.  Cope,  of  Philadelphia. 
Possibly  no  two  American  workers  could  be  brought  together  who 
would  more  fairly  represent  the  conceptions  which  really  rule 
among  evolutionary  thinkers.  Both  have  been  decidedly  com- 
mitted to  this  scheme  of  thought  from  the  beginning,  and  have 


shown  themselves  leaders  among  their  fellows.  Yet  they  stand 
very  far  apart  in  many  respects.  Prof.  Le  Conte  has  devoted 
much  consideration  to  the  religious  bearings  of  the  new  philoso- 
phy; while  Prof.  Cope  has  spent  his  strength  in  purely  scientific 
investigations.  In  them,  where  they  meet,  so-called  Christian 
evolution  meets  with  so-called  purely  scientific  evolution;  so  that 
their  agreements  will  register  for  us  what  may  be  fairly  looked 
upon  as  the  common  ground  upon  which  evolutionary  thinkers 
meet  to-day. 

The  first  thing  that  is  apt  to  strike  the  reader  of  the  two 
papers  is  the  absolute  unity  of  the  two  writers  in  their  conception 
of  what  evolution  is.  Each  gives  a  formal  definition  of  evolution, 
and  the  two  definitions  read  like  the  product  of  a  single  pen. 
Prof.  Cope  says:  "The  doctrine  of  evolution  may  be  defined  as  the 
teaching  which  holds  that  creation  has  been  and  is  accomplished 
by  the  agency  of  the  energies  which  are  intrinsic  in  the  evolving 
matter,  and  without  the  interference  of  agencies  which  are  exter- 
nal to  it."  Prof.  Le  Conte  says:  "Evolution  may  be  defined  as  con- 
tinuous progressive  change,  according  to  certain  laws  and  by 
'means  of  resident  forces,  i.  e.,  by  natural  forces  residing  in  the 
thing  evolving."  In  brief,  each  alike  conceives  evolution  as  a 
doctrine  of  self-creation.  As  over  against  all  conceptions  of  crea- 
tion by  powers,  forces  or  agents  intruding  into  nature  from  with- 
out, evolution  is  conceived  by  them  as  a  doctrine  of  creation  by 
the  energies  and  forces  of  nature  itself.  The  emphasis  in  both 
cases  is  placed  on  the  contention  that  the  forces  operative  in  the 
process  are  "intrinsic,"  or  "resident,"  in  the  thing  evolving. 
Prof.  Le  Conte  still  further  accentuates  this  by  the  added  defini- 
tion, "i.  e.,  by  natural  forces  residing  in  the  thing  evolving." 
Prof.  Cope  does  the  same  by  adding  to  the  positive  statement  the 
negative  clause,  "and  without  the  interference  of  agencies  which' — n 
are  external  to  it."  It  is  quite  clear  that  with  both,  the  funda-  1 
mental  point  is  that  evolution  is  a  doctrine  of  self-creation.  If,  and  / 
so  far  as,  there  is  intrusion  of  force  or  interference  of  agency  from  / 
without,  evolution  ceases.  ~^ 

The  next  thing  that  is  apt  to  strike  the  x'eader  is  the  thor- 
ough-going radicalism  of  both  writers  as  to  the  sphere  which  they 
hand  over  to  this  process  of  self-creation.  To  both  alike,  the  uni- 
verse and  all  it  contains  is  the  sphere  of  this  all-inclusive  self-pro- 
duction. All  that  is,  with  the  exclusion  of  nothing,  is  the  product 
of  the  interaction  of  the  forces,  or  energies,  intrinsic  or  resident 
in  the  primal  substance.  Prof.  Cope  says  simply  that  the  energy 
by  which  all  is  accomplished,  "is  a  property  of  the  physical  basis 


of  tridimensional  matter,  and  is  not  outside  of  it."  Prof.  Le Conte 
is  equally  thorough-going.  He  enumerates  several  grades  of  evo- 
lution. He  tells  us  that  "matter  by  combination,  re-combination, 
and  therefore  by  purely  chemical  forces,  rose  to  higher  and  more 
complex  forms  until  it  reached  protoplasm;"  and  "in  achieving 
protoplasm,"  it  achieved  "with  it  mobility  and  sensibility,  i.  e., 
life."  Under  the  g'uidance  of  this  "higher  form  of  resident  force," 
matter  went  on  until  it  achieved  man,  and,  with  man,  self-conscious 
reason;  under  the  guidance  of  this  new  resident  force  again  it  is  to 
go  on  until  it  achieves  society  and  finally  the  Divine  man. 
Throughout  the  whole  process  nothing  comes  in  from  the  outside, 
either  in  the  way  of  energy  or  in  the  way  of  direction.  "Matter" 
stands  at  the  bottom  with  its  resident  forces;  or,  as  Prof.  Cope 
phrases  it,  "the  physical  basis  of  tridimensional  matter,"  with  its 
"intrinsic  energies."  And  all  that  comes  to  be,  comes  into  being 
only  through  the  movements  of  this  matter  by  means  of  its  resident 
forces.  It  is  not  only  a  theory  of  self -creation,  but  it  is  a  theory  of 
the  self-creation  of  all  that  is. 

And  this  means,  it  will  not  fail  to  strike  the  reader  further, 
that  evolution  is,  in  the  hands  of  both  these  writers  alike,  a  phil- 
osophy of  the  universe.  It  will  not  suffice  to  say  that  they,  or  either 
of  them,  look  upon  it  merely  as  a  theory  of  the  method  of  creation, 
of  the  mode  in  which  differentiations  of  form  have  come  into  being. 
It  is  presented  by  both  of  them  alike  a3  a  theory  of  creation  itself, 
accounting  for  all  things  that  are.  ''It  is  not  merely  that  they  omit 
to  mention  the  higher  directive  power  that  may  yet  preside 
over  the  process  of  change,  and  lead  it  to  a  preconceived  goal;  it  is 
not  even  merely  that  they  render  the  assumption  of  such  a  power 
superfluous;  they  directly  and  emphatically  exclude  it.  Prof. 
Cope  tells  us  plainly  that,  in  his  mind,  there  is  an  active  exclusion 
of  interfering  agencies  from  without.  And  Prof.  Le  Conte,  with 
scarcely  less  einphasis,  gives  us  to  understand  that  it  is  "nature," 
which  in  his  mind  is,  through  this  process,  "struggling  upwards" 
towards  "the  divine  plane  from  which  it  originated,"  and  not  God 
who  is  moulding  nature  through  the  ages  to  his  will.  To  both 
writers  alike,  evolution  is  a  philosophy — -a  philosophy  which  ac- 
counts for  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  for  all  that  is  in  it,  without 
calling  in  any  interference  from  without. 

Naturally,  both  must  have  something  to  start  with,  in  this 
process  of  self-creation.  And  for  both  alike  this  "something  to 
start  with"  is  phenomenally  nothing  other  than  matter  with  its  pri- 
mary qualities.  Prof.  Cope  calls  it,  indeed,  "the  physical  basis  of 
tridimensional  matter. "     But  by  this  he  only  means  that  he  con- 


5 

ceives  that,  behind  matter  as  we  know  it,  there  lies  yet  a  simpler 
form  of  substance,  so  that  matter  as  we  have  it — "tridimensional 
matter'' — is  itself  a  product  of  evolutionary  process.  But  this 
simplest  primordial  substance  is  still  physical;  and  it  is  by  its  in- 
trinsic energies  alone  that  it  has  lifted  itself  first  into  "tridimen- 
sional matter,"  then  into  organized  matter,  and  then  into  reason- 
ing matter.  Prof.  Ls  Conte's  ontology  is  no  less  really  material- 
istic. He  gives  us  to  understand,  to  be  sure,  that  "the  plane  from 
which  all  evolution  sprang"  was  "divine,"  even  as  the  goal  to 
which  it  tends  is  "divine;"  so  that  "nature  by  evolution  through 
infinite  time  has  struggled  upward  to  reach  again  the  divine 
plane  from  which  it  originated."  But  "the  thing  evolving"  in 
its  primordial  stage,  he  identifies  with  what  we  know  as  matter  in 
its  simplest  form,  endowed  with  or  at  least  active  only  in  "its 
purely  chemical  properties."  The  emergence  of  further  and 
higher  qualities  comes  later  on,  in  the  process  of  evolution  itself. 
Thus  to  identify  God  with  matter,  or  to  call  matter  God,  does  not 
appear  to  us  to  improve  things.  The  diffei^ence  between  a  pan- 
theistic and  a  materialistic  ontology  is  insignificant  in  a  connec- 
tion of  this  kind;  in  both  alike,  it  is  from  what  we  know  as  matter 
in  its  simplest  form  that  all  that  is  has  come.  Whence  this  pri- 
mordial matter  comes,  neither  writer  tells  us.  Probably  both 
would  speak  of  it  as  eternal.  The  one  may  possibly  take  this  in 
the  materialistic  sense,  and,  projecting  his  imagination  back- 
wards, might  expect  to  find  nothing  but  "the  physical  basis  of  tri- 
dimensional matter"  behind.  The  other  may  take  it  in  a  panthe- 
istic sense,  and  conceive  behind  all  changes  what  he  calls  "God" 
— but  God  in  the  form  of  simple  undifferentiated  matter.  To  both 
alike,  simple  matter,  with  its  own  intrinsic  or  resident  forces,  is 
all  that  is,  and  all  that  has  come  to  be  is  its  evolution,  i.  e.,  its 
changes  of  form  under  the  action  of  its  own  intrinsic  energies. 

It  assuredly  will  not  escape  the  reader  that  this  philosophical 
theory  has  no  claim  to  be  called  "science."  It  is  purely  a pnon 
construction.  Who  has  shown  Prof.  Cope  his  "physical  basis  of 
tridimensional  matter"?  What  "scientific  discovery"  has  revealed 
to  Prof.  Le  Conte  that  "God"  is  identical  with  primal  matter  and 
can  be  attained  by  primal  matter  rising,  through  the  operation  of 
its  resident  forces,  back  to  the  plane  from  which  it  started?  What 
discovery  has  shown  him  that  protoplasm  is  a  simple  chemical 
compound? — that  life  is  a  product  of  chemical  reaction? — that  rea- 
son is  modified  life? — that  God  is  advanced  reason?  Observed  fact 
cuts  no  figure  in  these  theories.  Indeed,  the  reader  will  nowhere 
find   himself  more  emancipated  from  the  trammels   of  fact  than 


when  reading  such  an  imaginative  construction  as  Prof.  Le 
Conte's.  He  may  feel  himself  in  the  hands  of  a  poet  whose  feet 
scorn  the  earth,  as  he  skims  his  opulent  pages.  But  he  can  not 
discover  the  foundations  of  fact  on  which  these  great  dreams  are 
built. 

Nor  can  it  possibly  escape  the  reader  that  evolution,  conceived 
thus  as  an  all-inclusive  philosophy,  leaves  little  room  in  the 
universe  for  what  the  Christian  calls  God.  Even  a  materialistic 
scheme  of  evolution  may,  to  be  sure,  comport  with  a  Deistic  con- 
ception of  God.  After  all.  Professor  Cope  is  not  entitled  simply  to 
assume  "a  physical  basis  of  tridimensional  matter,"  so  endowed 
that  by  virtue  of  its  intrinsic  energies  lone  it  may  unfold  itself 
into  a  universe  of  order  and  of  mind.  We  need  still  to  ask  whence 
this  physical  basis  of  matter  and  whence  its  wonderful  powers, 
enfolding  within  themselves  the  promise  and  potency  of  every 
form  of  life.  At  the  least,  we  need  a  power  outside  and  beyond 
the  evolving  stuff  to  make  the  stuff,  to  give  its  forces  to  it  and  to 
set  it  going— a  primum  movens,  in  this  sense.  And  the  most  entire 
system  of  self-creation  equally  may  comport  with  a  pantheistic 
conception  of  God.  Prof.  Le  Conte  may  teach  all  he  teaches  as  to 
the  involution  of  all  that  is  in  simple  matter  and  its  gradual  evo- 
lution from  it  up  to  God  himself,— if  he  understands  by  God  only 
the  All,  whose  varying  manifestations  the  changing  world  is,  who 
is  not  only  entangled  in  matter,  but  is  indistinguishable  from  mat- 
ter, and  who  is  only  as  matter  is  and  what  matter  may  at  any  mo- 
ment chance  to  be.  But  it  seems  perfectly  obvious  that  this  evolu- 
tionary philosophy  leaves  no  place  for  the  Christian's  God,  who  is 
not  the  God  afar  off'  of  the  Deist,  and  not  the  simple  world-ground 
of  the  Pantheist,  but  the  Living  God  of  the  Bible— at  once  above 
the  world  and  in  the  world,  the  author  of  the  world  and  its  strong 
governor;  who  is  not  far  from  any  one  of  us,  but  yet  is  a  somewhat 
outside  and  above  us;  who  is  to  the  world  and  to  man  at  least  a 
power  without  them  making  for  righteousness. 

Theism  has,  of  course,  no  quarrel  with  second-causes.  It 
would  not  substitute  the  direct  divine  action  for  the  operation  of 
the  natural  forces  which  God  has  made,  and  which  are  real  forces,* 
really  operative,  just  because  "He  who  can"  has  made  them  such. 
But  neither  can  it  j^ermit  second-causes  to  be  substituted  for  the 
Living  God,  who  doeth  his  pleasure  amid  the  armies  of  heaven 
and  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth.  The  universe  was  not 
self-created.  It  was  God  that  made  it,  and  without  him  was  not 
any  thing  made  that  has  been  made.  No  philosophy  the  very 
principle  of  which  is  to  account  for  all  that  is  without  God,  can 
possibly  take  a  really  theistic  view  of  the  world.     In  this  sense. 


evolution  as  conceived  by  both  of  our  present  writers  is,  there- 
fore, tantamount  to  atheism.  It  has  no  room  in  all  its  thought 
for  a  Living  God— for  a  God  who  not  only  Is,  but  who  Can  and 
who  Does. 

II. 
There  are  three  general  positions  which  may  be  taken  up  with 
reference  to  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  which  has  so  deeply  affected 
modern  thought  as  to  the  origin  of  the   universe   and   all   that   it 
contains. 

1.  We  may  look  upon  this  doctrine  as  supplying  an  obviously 
true  and  adequate  philosophy  of  being,  and  treat  it  as  furnishing  a 
complete  account  of  the  origin  and  present  state  of  the  universe. 
It  is  so  looked  upon  by  a  large  number  of  writers  of  light  and 
leading.  Thus  Prof.  Huxley  affirms  "that  the  whole  world,  living 
and  not  living,  is  the  result  of  the  natural  interaction,  according 
to  definite  laws,  of  the  powers  possessed  by  the  molecules  of  which 
the  primitive  nebulosity  of  the  universe  was  composed."  This  pe- 
tition is,  of  course,  tantamount  to  atheism:  and  it  is  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  the  theist  whether  it  takes  a  materialistic  or  a 
pantheistic  shape.  When  Mr.  Darwin  put  forth  his  Origin  of  Spe- 
cies, he  was  confining  his  survey  to  the  origin  of  the  divergent 
forms  of  animated  existence.  He  consequently  postulated  the  ex- 
istence of  life  and  living  forms.  Moreover,  he  wrote  that  book  at 
a  stage  in  his  ever-shifting  opinion  as  to  divine  things,  when  he 
was  feeling  theistically;  he,  therefore,  spoke  throughout  it  in  a^ 
theistic  sense  and  theistic  lartguage.  But  that  the  theory,  as  held 
by  him,  was  essentially  atheistic,  as  Dr.  Charles  Hodge  pointed 
out  in  a  vigorous  little  volume,  was  fully  exhibited  by  his  drift 
away  from  theism,  as  recorded  in  his  Life  and  Letters. 

2.  We  may  consider  the  doctrine  of  evolution  as  a  discovery 
by  science  of  the  process  through  which  this  ordered  world  in 
which  we  live  has,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  come  into  existence:  and 
treat  it  merely  as  an  account  of  the  manner  in  which  the  universe, 
considered  as  a  cosmos,  has  been  produced,  and  all  the  forms  cf 
being  which  constitute  it  have  been  brought  into  being.  In  this 
form,  evolution  is  not  conceived  as  the  ultimate  account  of  any 
thing;  it  is  made  a  second  cause,  and  implies  a  first  cause  working 
by  and  through  it.  In  this  form,  accordingly,  it  is  not  only  not 
atheistic,  but  implies  and  pre-supposes  theism.  This  is  the  form 
in  which  it  is  conceived  by  theistic  thinkers;  and  a  notable  exam- 
ple of  its  presentation  from  this  point  of  view  may  be  found  in  the 
writings  of  the  late  Dr.  James  McCosh.  Dr.  McCosh  speaks  of  ev- 
olution as  "demonstrated"'  fact;  and  yet  harnesses  it  to  his  own 
theistic  conceptions,  and  makes  it  subservient  to  and  indeed  give 


8 

way  before  even  his  Christian  supernaturalism.  When  so  dealt 
with,  the  doctrine  of  evolution  only  supplies  the  Christian  thinker 
with  an  account  of  the  mode  and  method  of  creation. 

3.  We  may  look  upon  the  doctrine  of  evolution  as  a  more  or 
less  probable,  or  a  more  or  less  improbable,  conjecture  of  scientific 
workers  as  to  the  method  of  creation;  and  thus  treat  it  as,  as  yet, 
only  a  working  hypothesis  suggested  to  account  for  the  manner  in 
which  the  universe  has  come  into  being,  and  seeking  now  to  try 
itself  by  the  facts.  This  has  always  been  the  attitude  of  the  more 
cautious  thinkers,  and  in  the  progi^ess  of  scientific  investigation  it 
is  becoming  now  somewhat  more  common  to  find  it  adopted  even 
by  scientific  workers  themselves.  An  increasing  caution  is  ob- 
servable in  assertion;  perhaps  we  may  even  say,  an  increasing 
doubt  as  to  the  universality  and  sufficiency  of  evolution.  In  the 
new  edition  of  his  admirably  restrained  and  sensible  lectures  on 
.  The  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man,  Dr.  John  Laidlaw  points  out  how  much 
l3§s  frequently  now  than  a  few  years  ago  the  claim  is  made  for  the 
evolutionary  hypothesis  "as  a  universal  solvent  of  the  question  of 
origins."  And  he  points  out  with  this  the  effect  of  the  change  of 
attitude  on  the  duty  of  the  Christian  thinker.  "In  face  of  these 
recent  confessions  of  the  merely  tentative  character  of  the  hypo- 
thesis," he  remarks,  "the  lesson  for  the  interpreter  of  Scripture  is 
plain.  For  him  to  hasten  to  propound  schemes  of  conciliation  be- 
tween the  Mosaic  account  of  creation  and  the  Darwinian  pedigree 
of  the  lower  animals  and  man  would  be  to  repeat  an  old  and,  now, 
an  unpardonable  blunder." 

In  a  word,  the  really  pressing  question  with  regard  to  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution  is  not,  on  the  one  hand,  whether  it  supplies  in 
itself  an  adequate  account  of  the  origin  of  being  and  the  differen- 
tiation of  forms,  nor,  on  the  other,  whether  the  old  faith  can  live 
with  this  new  doctrine.  The  first  of  these  questions  only  raises  in 
a  new  form  the  old  problem  of  the  atheistic  philosojihy  which  can 
not  deserve  a  new  discussion  merely  because  it  has  put  on  a  new 
dress.  The  second  of  them  opens  only  a  purely  idle  speculation, 
which  is  careless  whether  it  deals  with  realities  or  shadows.  We 
may  be  sure  that  the  old  faith  will  be  able  not  merely  to  live  with, 
but  to  assimilate  to  itself  all  facts.  "The  gold  of  fact,"  says  Dr. 
Laidlaw  finely,  "will  form  at  length  the  perfect  ring  of  truth 
when  the  crust  of  suppositions  which  have  helped  in  its  formation 
shall  be  dissipated  into  dust  and  ashes."  Meanwhile,  having  "a 
revealed  account  of  the  origin  of  the  world  and  man,  which  coin- 
cides with  the  instinctive  beliefs  of  the  human  mind,  with  the  plan 
of  human  history,  with  the   faith   and   hope  that  are  in  God,"  we 


need  not  be  over-anxious  whether  or  not  it  can  be  shown  to   coin- 
cide also  with  every  tentative   supposition.     The  only  living  ques--.^^^ 
tion  with  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  evolution  still   is  whether  it  is       7 

true.     And  the  only  reasonable  reply  which  can  be  given   to  this 1 

question  to-day  is  that  it  is  subjudice.  This  is  not  equivalent,  of 
course,  to  saying  that  it  is  not  true.  We  may  hold  it  to  be  prob- 
ably true,  and  yet  agree  that  it  is  still  upon  its  trial  and  has  not 
yet  been  shown  to  be  true.  But  we  think  it  must  be  admitted  that 
it  has  not  yet  been  shown  to  be  true,  and  must  still  be  ranked  not 
as  "demonstrated"  fact  but  only  as  a  more  or  less  probable  or  a 
more  or  less  improbable  working  hypothesis. 

To  be  sure,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is  scarcely  legiti- 
mate to  ask  any  thing  of  the  nature  of  a  strict  "demonstration,"  or 
even  any  thing  like  direct  proof,  for  a  theory  of  this  sort.  Proof 
of  a  hypothesis  of  this  kind  can  only  be  of  a  probable  order,  and 
can  arise  only  out  of  inferences  from  observed  effects  to  causes  and 
processes.  It  is  quite  conceivable,  however,  that  such  proof  might 
reach  stringent  validity  and  command  assent.  Its  power  to  do  so 
would  depend  on  the  ability  of  the  suggested  hypothesis  to  explain 
with  ease  and  completeness  all  the  observed  facts.  ■  And  by  this 
we  must  mean  something  more  than  merely  the  possibility  of 
wrenching  some  kind  of  explanation  of  the  facts  out  of  the  hypo- 
thesis. Most  of  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  could  find  some 
sort  of  explanation  in  the  Ptolemaic  theory.  The  probability  of  a 
theory  thus  increases  not  only  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  the 
facts  of  which  it  supplies  an  explanation,  but  also  in  proportion  to 
the  cleanness,  so  to  speak,  with  which  it  explains  them,  and  its 
power  to  illuminate  the  connection  between  the  facts  and  thus 
supply  a  basis  for  deduction,  by  which  we  may  (1)  deduce  from  the 
terms  of  the  theory  all  the  known  facts,  and  thus,  as  it  were,  prove 
its  truth;  and  (2)  deduce  also  new  facts,  not  hitherto  known,  by 
which  it  become  j  predictive  and  the  instrument  of  the  discovery 
of  new  facts,  which  are  sought  for  and  observed  only  on  the  ex- 
pectation roused  by  the  theory.  It  is  quite  possible,  by  a  combina- 
tion of  such  results,  so  fully  and  powerfully  to  commend  a  sug- 
gested hypothesis  that  the  mind  cannot  resist  the  evidence  in  its 
favor.  It  may  with  such  cleanness  and  perfection  explain  all  the 
observed  facts,  with  such  power  of  illumination  uncover  obscure 
points  and  reveal  new  and  unexpected  elements  of  fact,  and  with 
such  certainty  determine  the  facts  subsumed  under  it  and  lead  on 
to  the  discovery  of  others,  that  we  can  not  escape  the  conviction 
that  in  it  we  have  exactly  the  key  that  belongs  to  this  lock.  And,  • 
of  coui^se,  it  follows  that  the  moi^e  complicated  the  lock  is,  the 
greater  is  the  certainty  that  we  have  found  its   true  key  when  we 


10 

have  a  key  which  smoothly  and  cleanly  fits  every  ward.  But  it 
must  fit  the  wards.  The  simplest  bent  wire  will  often  serve  as  a 
pick  to  open  a  lock.  And  as  it  is  not  every  key  that  will  open  a 
lock  which  is  its  own  proper  key,  so  it  is  not  every  theory  that 
will  open  a  problem  which  is  its  own  proper  explanation.  There 
is  such  a  thing  as  picking-  the  lock  of  a  problem  as  well  as  of  a 
safe,  and  science  needs  protection  against  burglary  just  as  truly  as 
banks. 

But  if  it  is  true  that  not  every  theory  which  will  provide  some 
sort  of  explanation  for  the  facts  is  the  true  theory  to  assume  for 
their  explanation,  it  is,  of  course,  a  fortiori  true  that  no  theory 
which  will  not  explain  the  facts  can  possibly  be  the  true  theory. 
Every  theory  proposed  to  account  for  a  body  of  facts  must  run  two 
gauntlets.  It  must  first  of  all  be  shown  to  be  capable  of  accounting 
for  the  facts.  It  is  sometimes  assumed  that  this  is  all  that  can  be 
asked  of  it.  But  all  that  has  been  so  far  shown  is  that,  should  there 
be  reason  to  believe  that  this  hypothesis  is  the  true  one,  it  may  be 
accepted  as  such — no  facts  stand  in  the  way.  We  must  now  ask 
what  reason  exists  for  supposing  it  to  be  the  true  account  of  the 
facts.  In  other  words,  we  must  now  range  it  alongside  of  whatever 
other  theories  exist  also  capable  of  accounting  for  the  facts,  and 
seek  grounds  for  choice  between  them.  Every  thing  is  not  true 
that  is  shown  to  be  possibly  true.  The  race  is  to  be  run  between 
the  various  theories  which  have  been  shown  to  be  able  to  account 
for  the  facts.  The  preliminary  exhibition  of  ability  to  account  for 
the  facts  is  only  conforming  to  the  condition  of  entry  for  the  race. 
Assuredly  the  prize  cannot  be  claimed  before  the  race  is  run, 
merely  on  presentation  of  clean  entry  papers.  Much  more  assur- 
edly the  prize  can  not  be  claimed  before  the  entry  is  itself  ap- 
proved. 

If  now  it  be  asked  what  is  the  exact  status  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution,  it  will  be  scarcely  possible  to  affirm  that  it  has  as  yet 
been  shown  that  it  is  capable  of  accounting  for  all  the  facts.  Pre- 
cisely what  is  now  under  investigation  is  whether  the  facts  as 
known  can  be  accounted  for  on  this  hypothesis.  There  is  a  wide- 
spread feeling  abroad  that,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  it  is  capable  of 
accounting  for  all  the  facts,  this  is  the  proper  theory  to  assume  in 
order  to  account  for  them.  And  there  is  a  wide-spread  expecta- 
tion that  sooner  or  later,  in  one  form  or  another,  the  evolutionary 
hypothesis  will  be  shown  to  be  able  to  account  for  all  the  facts. 
But  it  is  surely  premature  to  say  of  it  that  it  has  already  been  shown 
to  be  able  to  account  for  all  the  facts.  And  we  can  only  think 
that  enthusiasm  has  run  away  with  good  judgment  when  we  hear 
it  said,  as  we  sometimes  do  hear  it  said,  that  we  have  the  same 


11 

proof  for  the  doctrine  of  evolution  which  we  have  for  Newton's 
theory  of  gravitation.  There  is  an  essential  difference  between 
these  two  cases  in  kind,  as  readers  of  Dr.  Flint's  paper  on  Theology 
in  the  ninth  edition  of  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  will  have  lu- 
cidly expounded  to  them.  But  apart  from  this,  it  would  seem  to 
be  too  evident  to  require  statement  that  the  proof  that  evolution 
will  account  for  all  the  facts  observed  in  the  sphere  for  which  it 
has  to  account,  as  yet  lags.  It  may  be  far  from  plain  that  it  can 
not  account  for  all  these  facts.  It  is  as  yet  equally  far  from  plain 
that  it  can  account  for  them  all.  It  is  in  the  effort  to  show  that  it 
can  account  for  them  that  a  thousand  scientific  investigators  are 
now  engaged. 

Possibly  this  over-enthusiastic  assertion  that  evolution  has 
been  shown  to  be  able  to  account  for  all  observed  facts  in  the 
sphere  of  its  assumed  operation,  may  find  its  explanation,  in  part, 
in  a  perhaps  not  unnatural  extension  of  a  happy  experience  in  a 
narrower  to  an  unwarrantedly  broadened  field.  The  doctrine  of 
evolution  has  served  us,  we  will  say,  in  our  endeavors  to  unravel 
some  exceptionally  hard  problem.  In  the  enthusiasm  of  this  ex- 
perience we  declare  it  able  to  unravel  all  similar  problems.  This 
is  the  natural  history  of  all  panaceas.  It  is  scarcely  stringent 
logic,  however,  to  infer  from  the  fact  that  a  theory  can  account 
for  some  facts,  that  it  therefore  can  account  for  all  facts.  Yet  this 
is  a  logic  from  which  advocates  of  evolution  have  not  kept  their 
skirts  free.  A  possible  genealogy  is  made  out,  for  example,  for 
the  Equidse,  which  might  possibly  be  accounted  for  on  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution.  It  is  then  assumed  that  this  is  the  actual  gene- 
alogy of  the  Equidae  and  that  evolution  is  the  right  account  to  give 
of  it.  And  then  it  is  forthwith  assumed  that  because  evolution 
may  thus  possibly  account  for  the  Equidte  it  is  also  the  true  account 
to  assume  for  the  origin  of  species  and  genera  for  which  we  can 
not,  as  yet  at  least,  make  out  any  genealogy  which  is  at  all  consist- 
tent  with  the  doctrine  of  evolution, — of  the  Trilobites,  say,  or  of 
the  Devonian  Fishes.  Students  of  logic  might  obtain  some  very 
entertaining  examples  of  fallacy  by  following  the  processes  of  rea- 
soning by  which  evolutionists  sometimes  commend  their  findings 
to  a  docile  world.  The  treatment  of  the  apparition  of  the  Fishes 
in  the  Devonian  age  in  Prof.  Le  Conte's  Manual  of  Geology  may  be 
commended  to  such  as  a  shining  instance,  which,  unfortunately, 
does  not  stand  alone.  But  we  scarcely  need  a  better  example  than 
that  in  hand.  Because  a  possible  genealogy  can  be  constructed  for  a 
number  of  forms,  chiefly  in  the  upper  strata,  for  which  evolution 
might  possibly  supply  an  account,  it  does  not  follow  that  evolution 


12 

is  shown  to  be  the  true  account  of  the  whole  series  of  forms  pre- 
sented to  us  in  the  crust  of  the  earth.  And  it  will  hardly  do  to 
clench  this  somewhat  violent  inference  by  an  appeal  to  the  law  of 
continuity  and  uniformity  in  nature,  which  is  rather  too  sharp  a 
two-edged  sword  for  evolutionists  safely  to  wield  at  this  stage  of 
the  investigation. 

It  ought  not  to  be  necessary  to  add  that  none  of  this  is  said 
with  a  view  to  giving* the  impression  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution 
has  been  disproved.  It  is  not  even  intended  to  suggest  that  it  is 
improbable.  We  only  wish  to  point  out  as  clearly  as  we  can  that 
it  is  as  yet  unproved;  that  its  present  status  is  that  of  a  suggested 
explanation  of  the  facts  of  nature  which  is  as  yet  on  its  trial,  as  to 
whether  it  can  supply  an  account  of  these  facts  or  not.  We  may 
deem  it  probable  or  we  may  deem  it  improbable  that  it  will  ever 
be  shown  to  be  able  to  account  for  these  facts.  It  will  certainly 
conduce  to  a  clearer  conception  of  the  state  of  the  ease  if  he  will 
recognize  it  according  to  our  different  judgments  as,  as  yet,  only  a 
more  or  less  probable  or  a  more  or  less  improbable  conjecture  of 
scientific  workers  as  to  the  method  and  course  of  creation. 


